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This paper follows the idea put forward by George Akerlof in his Nobel prize lecture
of 2001, namely that in order to get ”better” macroeconomic models, one should
start dealing explicitly with the psychological and sociological dimensions of indi-
viduals’ decisions and actions. He thus argues in favor of a ”Behavioral Macroeco-
nomics” in order to explain ”Macroeconomic Behavior”.1 I will follow this approach
by linking two recent strands in economic theory with regard to the concrete example
of how agents discount the future. First, in the macroeconomic ﬁeld, there has been
the emergence of the ”New Keynesian Model”, or the ”New Consensus Model”.2
A three equation macroeconomic model is derived from an explicit microeconomic
optimization framework consisting of an IS-equation for the goods market, a Phillips
Curve for the price formation block, and a Taylor-rule as the reaction function of
the central bank. The results are then similar to the older Neoclassical Synthesis
Model, i.e., one gets an eﬀect of aggregate demand on output in the short run,
due to price stickiness in the goods market, and a supply-side determined long-run
equilibrium. This approach sees nominal price and wage rigidities at the heart of
economic volatility. Assuming imperfect competition in the goods market and ﬁrms
facing ”menu costs” and thus being unwilling to adjust prices in response to a change
in the demand for their product, it is shown that the economy does not react im-
mediately to a shock. Hence, monetary policy gains the potential to stabilize the
economy in the short run, which may justify calling this model (New) Keynesian.3
Besides these seminal advances in macroeconomic theory, the microeconomic
ﬁeld saw the incorporation of psychological insights into the standard framework,
an approach which has become known under the name ”Behavioral Economics”. On
the basis of empirical studies and experiments, it is shown that individuals mostly
behave in a completely diﬀerent way as it is usually assumed by the metaphor
of the standard rational optimizing agent. Examples range, among others, from
expectations formation to fairness motives, time discounting, and income framing.4
However, this promising approach mostly stays in a microeconomic framework so
far, or in a partial equilibrium context when it is used to address macroeconomic
questions such as individuals’ saving behavior. In general equilibrium models such
1See Akerlof (2002) and Akerlof (2007).
2Whether these kinds of models should be called ”New Keynesian”, ”New Consensus”, or
”New Monetarist” has recently become controversial in the literature. Additionally, one also ﬁnds
the names ”New IS-LM model” (King, 2000) and ”standard aggregate-demand- aggregate supply
model” (De Grauwe, 2008). However, this question of taxonomy is beyond the scope of this paper,
so I will use the name ”New Keynesian Model” in what follows.
3The key reference is certainly Clarida et al. (1999), however, they do not provide an ex-
plicit derivation of the model. For this, they point to three central references: Walsh (2003),
McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Goodfriend and King (1997), however, only the ﬁrst provides a
full derivation of both the IS- and the Philips-Curve. A collection of earlier papers is provided
by Mankiw and Romer (1991), a more recent survey about the new IS-LM model is also given by
King (2000). A variation including capital accumulation can be found in Yun (1996).
4See for an overview of Behavioral Economics Camerer et al. (2003).
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as the New Keynesian Model, the assumption of the rational agent is maintained,
which is puzzling given the extensive empirical evidence against it.
This paper takes hyperbolic discounting as one of the recently popularized models
in Behavioral Economics and analyses its eﬀects in a New Keynesian macroeconomic
framework. I have chosen the question of discounting since this seems to be one of
the most general assumptions of the standard model, whereas an eﬀect of fairness,
for example, only applies in some context. Before deriving the model, Section 2
will give a thorough discussion of the current state of the New Keynesian Model,
some major critiques and extensions. This will also provide some motivation for the
later argument. In section 3 of the paper, I will ﬁrst explain the special features of
hyperbolic discounting and discuss its implications for the appropriate time horizon.
Emphasizing the role and modeling of consumption smoothing, I will then present a
full derivation of the IS curve with hyperbolic discounting. Discussing implications,
limitations and calling for future research, section 4 concludes.
2 New Keynesian Macroeconomics
2.1 The IS Curve and Extensions
2.1.1 The Standard New Keynesian IS Curve
At a ﬁrst glance, the New Keynesian IS Curve looks fairly similar to its traditional
formulation. In both cases, the goods market equilibrium depends negatively on
the real interest rate. However, already King (2000) pointed to some key diﬀerences
between the two formulations. First, the New Keynesian version stems from a
microeconomic optimization decision of a representative consumer, and not from
a ﬁrm’s investment decision. Second, given the use of rational expectations, the
consumer’s life time optimization program is formulated in an entirely forward-
looking way.5 Third, whereas the traditional formulation was expressed in levels, the
New Keynesian version delivers the optimal change in the variables. The result is an
Euler equation, expressing both consumption smoothing in case of expected future
income and intertemporal substitution of consumption with respect to changes in
the interest rate. Log-linearizing around a steady state yields the New Keynesian IS-
curve, interpreting the other goods market aggregates as exogenous demand shocks.
2.1.2 Problems of the Standard Approach
Recently, this approach has been criticized in various ways. A major point is the
fact that the New Keynesian IS-curve cannot give rise to suﬃcient persistence, i.e.
accounting for the high autocorrelation that is found in the data.6 Attempts to
validate Hall (1978)’s Random Walk hypothesis on an empirical basis show strong
5This can be seen by forwarding the standard equation (Clarida et al., 1999, p.1666).
6See Walsh (2003),p.240 and Fuhrer (1997) for empirical studies that suggest a signiﬁcant role
for lagged terms in the IS-equation.
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evidence for a comovement of consumption and income and a signiﬁcant role of
predictable changes of current income, in contrast to the predictions of the standard
consumption model. Already Campbell and Mankiw (1989) have provided evidence
against a too large role designed to consumption smoothing in face of future expected
income ﬂuctuations. A further question concerns the problem whether one should
include capital accumulation into the model. This is discussed in detail below.
2.1.3 Recent Extension Proposed in the Literature
Several extensions of the standard model have been proposed in order to cope with
the observed lack of persistence in the goods market formulation.
A ﬁrst strand of models uses habit formation for households’ consumption deci-
sions. The assumption of intertemporal separability of consumption goods is relaxed,
i.e., the agent gets utility from one consumption good over more than one period
which can be easily justiﬁed in the case of durable consumption goods. Models of
habit formation can also be interpreted such that individuals have recurring con-
sumption behavior, i.e. their decisions today also depend on their decisions in the
past.7
In a second strand of models, sociological insights are used. In habit formation
models, consumers base their decisions not only on their personal habits but also
on the consumption of their social reference group.8 It is an important feature of
these models that individuals do not only consider changes in consumption, as in
the standard Euler equation, but also take into account the level of consumption,
which leads to a higher persistence in spending. In a similar vein, Akerlof (2000)
and Akerlof (2007) has supported the importance of identity and social norms for
people’s behavior. If individuals deviate in their consumption decisions from es-
tablished social norms, for example by increasing current consumption spending in
anticipation of an inheritance in the future, they experience a loss in utility. Thus,
these models derive a minor importance for consumption smoothing.
A third strand of models consists of introducing rule-of-thumb, or Non-Ricardian
consumers into an otherwise standard optimization model. This approach assumes
that under the conditions of a complex economic environment, for a fraction of
agents it is too costly to make a decision using the optimization framework. In-
stead, if costs exceed a certain threshold they follow simple rule-of-thumbs.9 A
seminal contribution in this context is Gabaix and Laibson (2001)’s model of opti-
mization costs, in which agents only adjust their consumption decisions from time to
time. Gal´ ı et al. (2007), Gal´ ı et al. (2004) and Amato and Laubach (2003) have pro-
7A thorough presentation of the habit formation model can be found in Fuhrer (2000).
8See Falk and Knell (2004), who have also endogenized the reference standard.
9Amato and Laubach (2003) suggest that these rules should fulﬁll three requirements in order
to be superior to complex optimization. The orientation variable should be easily observable, the
rule should exhibit nearly no computation costs, and people should learn, i.e., the non-optimizing
households always adjust to the behavior of the optimizing households. Mostly, it is also assumed
that in the steady state, all agents behave in the same way, in order to simplify the analysis.
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posed models with rule-of-thumb consumers. However, their rules diﬀer. Gal´ ı et al.
(2007) build on the ﬁndings by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and state that one
fraction of households only consumes its current labor income. On the contrary,
Amato and Laubach (2003) suggest that the rule should simply be that a part of
households in the current period mimic the behavior of all agents in the previous
period, i.e., for rule-of-thumb consumers, consumption today simply equals con-
sumption yesterday.
2.2 The Phillips Curve and Extensions
2.2.1 The Standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve, as in the case of the New Keynesian IS curve,
is based on microeconomic optimization assuming rational expectations and thus
purely forward-looking agents. In order to get a sluggish response of the price level
in response to a demand shock, nominal rigidities are introduced. These stem from
the fact that ﬁrms act in a monopolistic environment thus having some price setting
power and, in addition, face some costs of adjusting prices (”menu costs”) which
make quantities react faster than prices.
There exists a number of diﬀerent price setting models in the literature from
which the New Keynesian Phillips Curve has been derived. Broadly, two approaches
can be distinguished, namely time-dependent models, in which the period in which
ﬁrms cannot change their prices is exogenously ﬁxed and state dependent models in
which the time period becomes an additional choice variable.
For the former approach, Roberts (1995), who has also introduced the name
”New Keynesian Phillips Curve”, has shown that the models of randomly price ad-
justment by Calvo (1983), of overlapping contracts by Taylor (1979), Taylor (1980)
and of minimizing deviation costs by Rotemberg (1982) lead to a very similar out-
come.10 For the latter approach, note that state-dependent pricing makes it possible
to avoid one of the main caveats of the widely used Calvo-model, namely the fact that
there could exist a considerable fraction of ﬁrms that have not adjusted their price
over a long period. Firms’ price setting depends on the probability whether they can
adjust their prices again in subsequent periods. However, in state-dependent mod-
els, these probabilities vary over time, thus changing the discount factor.11 Speciﬁc
features of state-dependent models are an inﬂuence of the functional form of demand
on the price adjustment and the possibility of non-linearities and multiple equilibria.
That time-dependent pricing models are more common in macroeconomic models
results from their higher analytical traceability.
10See Dotsey (2002) for a discussion of the diﬀerences between these models.
11”A high probability of adjustment in some future period leads the ﬁrm to set a price that
heavily discounts the eﬀects on proﬁts beyond that period.” (Dotsey and King, 2005,p.221)
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2.2.2 Problems of the Standard Approach
The critique of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve has been even more severe than in
the case of the goods market formulation and has lead Mankiw (2001) to talk about
”an inexorable and mysterious tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment”.
The critiques of the short-run Phillips Curve can be summarized as follows.
Time-dependent pricing models can generate persistence in the price level, since
individual prices cannot always be changed immediately, but this does hardly af-
fect the inﬂation rate. However, in a wide range of empirical studies following
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), a high autocorrelation in the inﬂation rate has been found,
pointing to the need of incorporating lagged terms into the inﬂation equation.12 An
additional objection has recently been raised by Rotemberg (2005). He quotes em-
pirical evidence suggesting that prices do not fully react to changes of marginal costs
or administrative costs. In Rotemberg (2008) he also quotes interviews with ﬁrm
managers that mention ”avoiding customer antagonism” and not costs of adjusting
prices as the main reason for leaving prices unchanged.
Concerning the long-run Phillips Curve, its assumed verticality has been highly
questioned. Even if already in the standard New Keynesian formulation the im-
plied long-run neutrality of money does not hold entirely, this fact has often been
concealed. As Woodford (2003), p.188, writes in his seminal book: ”note that in
Roberts (1995)’s presentation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, the discount
factor β is set equal to one. This simpliﬁcation may seem appealing, in that it im-
plies a vertical ”long-run” inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ. But correctly accounting for
the presence of the discount factor (...) has important consequences for the analysis
of optimal policy (...).” And as it has been put by Blanchard and Fischer (1989):
”Most economists who came to accept the view that there was no long-run trade-
oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment were more aﬀected by a priori argument
than by empirical evidence.” Graham and Snower (2008) also quote a wide range of
empirical studies questioning the long-run verticality of the Phillips Curve.
2.2.3 Recent Extensions Proposed in the Literature
Concerning the persistence in inﬂation, various attempts have been proposed to
derive this phenomenon in a theoretically convincing way.
First, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) have suggested that ﬁrms’ price setting should
be modeled diﬀerently, arguing in favor of a relative real contract price instead of
the usually adopted nominal one. In a similar vein, Christiano et al. (2005) have
introduced price and wage indexation into an otherwise standard price setting model,
in which non-optimizing ﬁrms have to stick with the price they had chosen before.
In contrast, adjusting ﬁrms set prices optimally from time to time, whereas the
actual price is automatically readjusted to changes in the aggregate price index in
the meantime.
12See for further references also Amato and Laubach (2003) and Mankiw (2001).
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A second proposition has been made by Sbordone (2002) and Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) who argued that the persistence stems from the fact that ﬁrms’ real marginal
costs do not respond immediately to changes in output, thus importing inertia into
the inﬂation equation from outside.
A third way of extending the standard model questions the assumption of ra-
tional expectations. Already Mankiw (2001) has admitted that using adaptive ex-
pectations gives the best empirical ﬁt. Recent estimations by Rudd and Whelan
(2006) show that adding lags to the forward looking Phillips curve indeed leads
to a better empirical ﬁt, however, they then ﬁnd nearly no additional gain from
including the forward looking term. They conclude that these results might be a
hint to the weakness of the rational expectations hypothesis: ”in the absence of any
agreement among economists on what the correct models for inﬂation (or the rest of
the economy) actually are, and given most individuals’ limited ability to understand
or model these uncertainties, a procedure in which agents base their expectations
for future inﬂation on extrapolations of the recent past may itself constitute a form
of optimizing behavior.”13 Also in this context, Mankiw and Reis (2006) suggest to
replace the sticky price/wages Phillips Curve by a sticky information formulation.
In this model, one fraction of agents sets prices according to the present information
set, while another fraction bases its decision on outdated information, either because
of costs of acquiring information or costs of reoptimization.
A fourth strand of dealing with serial correlation in the inﬂation rate has been
the introduction of non-optimizing price-setters in an otherwise standard optimizing
sticky-price model. It is assumed that ﬁrms do not only face ”menu costs” that
make them reluctant to change prices, but also optimization costs. Building on this
idea, albeit without explicitly modeling diﬀerent information sets, Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) and Amato and Laubach (2003) assume that only a part of ﬁrms sets prices
in an optimal manner whereas the remaining fraction follows a simple rule. This
rule is the same in both papers: non-optimizing ﬁrms set their price according to
the previously chosen price by both optimizing and non-optimizing ﬁrms and to the
previous inﬂation rate, which serves as a proxy to forecast current inﬂation.
Fifth, Rotemberg (2005) has suggested incorporating fairness considerations into
ﬁrms’ price setting. He states that consumers judge price increases by ﬁrms as fair
if they are linked to higher costs and as unfair if not. In the latter case, demand
should decrease much more than it is actually suggested by the demand elasticity.
However, ﬁrms try to avoid this reaction by taking into account consumers’ fairness
considerations which leads to fewer price adjustments. Rotemberg (2005) claims
that this idea can also explain persistence in the inﬂation rate. In situations of high
inﬂation, consumers start to think that ﬁrms’ costs have been increased and thus
accept further price increases as fair. This then provides a link from past inﬂation
to current inﬂation.
With regards to the long-run nonverticality of the Phillips Curve, only a few
13Rudd and Whelan (2006), p.319
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theoretical propositions have been made to account for this. Akerlof et al. (2000)
have provided a ”near-rational” model, in which price and wage setters ignore low
inﬂation rates or only treat them as one factor among others. By building on these
diﬀerent behavioral assumptions, they show that the result is a long-run trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and unemployment. The most well know explanation are models
of hysteresis which have been introduced ﬁrst by Blanchard and Summers (1986).
This approach claims that if policymakers do not react fast to a recession and
thus extend it longer than necessary, the fraction of long-term unemployed workers
increases leading to deteriorating eﬀects on the human capital of the labor force.
Through this channel, aggregate demand is also aﬀected in the long-run by moving
the non-accelerating-rate-of-unemployment (NAIRU).14 Graham and Snower (2008)
argue that the long-run Phillips Curve becomes non-vertical, if consumers discount
the future hyperbolically. Assuming rigid wages but ﬂexible prices, their model
works as follows: if inﬂation rises, the marginal disutility of work increases over
the wage contract period, whereas the marginal utility of consumption remains the
same. Hyperbolic discounting reduces the present value of the marginal disutility
of work relative to the marginal utility to consume. Then, the household raises his
labor supply in order to balance the two values; rising inﬂation leads to higher labor
supply and (in their model) also to more output.
2.3 Implications and Critique
The extensions of the New Keynesian models discussed so far are indeed able to
derive serial correlation in both the IS and the Phillips curve. As it has been put
recently by De Grauwe (2008), p.37, most of these approaches introduce inertia as
an exogenous variable, meaning that the source of the restriction lies outside the
model. For example, for the widely used Calvo-price setting, all ﬁrms would prefer
to set their price optimally, however, by assumption, one fraction is simply not
able to do so. The same is true for some of the habit formation models, in which
individuals do not smooth consumption due to exogenously given social norms that
are determined outside the model. Also the widely used rule-of-thumbs deal with
inertia in an exogenous way. Even if this approach justiﬁes the use of rule-of-
thumbs by optimization costs, it is not explicitly speciﬁed when and how these rules
are adopted. On the contrary, De Grauwe (2008) and also Mankiw and Reis (2006)
present models that include ”endogenous inertia”. In this case, the persistence
follows directly from the agents’ optimal decisions and is thus fully developed within
the model.
However, various critiques apply for the extensions discussed so far. In the case
of the IS curve, models of habit formation and social norms are certainly worth
following. However, Dynan (2000) runs a panel data estimation on the household
level without ﬁnding strong empirical evidence for habit formation.
14See for an empirical investigation Gottschalk and Fritsche (2005).
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In case of the Phillips Curve, no broadly accepted way of dealing with serial cor-
relation from a theoretical point of view has emerged so far. The Fuhrer and Moore
(1995) speciﬁcation is an ad hoc assumption and not derived from an optimiza-
tion framework, whereas for the price indexation of Christiano et al. (2005), no
compelling empirical evidence has been found. The idea of sluggishly adjusting
marginal costs by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) has been criticized by Fuhrer (2006), who
has shown that the persistence in the inﬂation rate does not stem from ”inherited
persistence”, i.e. from the sluggish adjustment of real marginal costs to the output
gap, but from ”intrinsic persistence”, i.e. the lagged term in the Phillips Curve. The
most fundamental critique can be raised in case of the widely used rule-of-thumbs
raise for both the IS and the Phillips Curve. First, these rules are not derived
from microeconomic decisions but are rather ”ad hoc” and are thus subject to the
same critique that has been raised earlier against the Neoclassical Synthesis mod-
els. Gal´ ı et al. (2007),p.238, themselves admit this, but see it as a minor problem:
”as noted we do not take a stand on the sources of that behavior, though one may
possibly attribute it to a combination of myopia, lack of access to ﬁnancial markets,
or (continuously) borrowing constraints.” However, I do not think that this missing
microeconomic foundation is a minor problem, namely because of a second critique
of the rule-of-thumb models. Since they are assumed ”ad hoc”, they can be rather
arbitrary, depending on the phenomenon the researcher wants to explain. Whereas
Gal´ ı et al. (2004) and Gal´ ı et al. (2007) aim to explain the working of monetary and
ﬁscal policy, Amato and Laubach (2003) are concerned with explaining the statis-
tical signiﬁcance of lagged terms in the IS and Phillips Curve. In both cases, a
diﬀerent rule is applied seeming to suggest that everything can be explained as long
as one introduces an appropriate rule. As an extreme case, Amato and Laubach
(2003) even assume a rule that mimics exactly the phenomenon they want to ex-
plain, namely a lagged term in both the supply and demand side of the economy.
Concerning the non-verticality of the long-run Phillips Curve, the recent propo-
sition by Graham and Snower (2008) is not convincing either. First, they assume
that ﬁrms act under conditions of perfect competition, i.e., they do not have any
price setting power, which stands both in contrast to the standard New Keynesian
Model and does not seem very plausible from an empirical point of view. Instead,
Graham and Snower (2008) model inﬂation persistence solely by introducing stag-
gered nominal wage contracts. Second, introducing hyperbolic discounting in this
framework leads to a mechanism which seems at least at odds. As I have explained
earlier, it attributes an entirely passive role to ﬁrms, whereas the work/leisure trade-
oﬀ becomes the main driving force of the model with the demand for labor adjusting
independently of any possible lack of demand on the goods markets. To me, these
features do not seem to ﬁt with economic reality.
To sum up, even if there have been some promising extensions of the overly
simplistic standard New Keynesian model, none of the recent approaches is fully
convincing. I will thus try to tackle the problem from a diﬀerent point of departure.
Introducing hyperbolic discounting in the IS curve, I will highlight the resulting
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diﬀerences to the standard framework. This has the advantage that hyperbolic
discounting is well grounded in microeconomic behavior, which makes it immune to
the critique of being ad hoc.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that two further important topics have not
yet been dealt with convincingly in New Keynesian Macroeconomics. First, a still
ongoing debate concerns the question whether and how to introduce money into the
model. Already Sidrauski (1967) has pointed to the fact that under an additively
separable utility function, money does not aﬀect the steady state of the model even
if it has been used in the utility function of the agent.15 Additively separable utility
also aﬀects the second open question, namely the possibility of multiple stable and
unstable equilibria.16 Without downplaying the importance of these questions, I
will not treat them further, since they do not aﬀect the question of how individuals
discount the future, which is the main purpose of this paper.
3 A Behaviorally Founded IS-Curve
3.1 Hyperbolic Discounting
I will now derive a Behavioral IS curve by introducing hyperbolic discounting in-
stead of the traditionally assumed exponential discounting. Since it is not the aim
of this paper to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this approach in depth,
I will simply give a short summary of the key features, referring to Angeletos et al.
(2001) and the references cited therein for more details. Strotz (1956) was the ﬁrst
to emphasize problems with the standard exponential time discounting being used
in life-time optimization models. The standard exponential discounting procedure
implies a constant rate of decline in the utility of consumption, for example, in future
periods. However, a wide range of psychological evidence has suggested that indi-
viduals are impatient in the short run and patient in the long run, hence, suggesting
a higher discount rate in the present than in the future. This feature can be modeled
by hyperbolic functions. Laibson (1997) in his seminal paper and Phelps and Pollak
(1968) have introduced a discrete version of this, called the ”quasi-hyperbolic” dis-
count function, which also captures the empirical evidence that the discount rate
drops sharply in the second period. For sake of simplicity, I will also use their quasi-
hyperbolic model, with discount factors 1,δβ,δβ2,δβ3,..., with δ as short run and β
as long-run discount factors. Note that the quasi-hyperbolic discount model implies
dynamic inconsistency, i.e., a decision maker in the current period will change his
preferences in later periods. This is highlighted by a well known example: Being
asked today whether they prefer one apple today or two apples tomorrow, most
consumers choose the one apple. But when being asked whether they prefer one
apple in one year or two apples in one year and one day, most consumers choose
15See Jones and Stracca (2008) for a recent empirical treatment of this assumption.
16See Obstfeld (1984) and Ono (2001) for a detailed discussion of this topic.
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the second option.17 This inconsistency leads to an intrapersonal conﬂict between
the diﬀerent current and future selves of an individual: An early self tries to impose
his preferences on later selves whereas the later selves maximize their own interests.
Already Strotz (1956) has modeled this situation as an intrapersonal game.
3.2 The Question of the Appropriate Time Horizon
It is an important implication of hyperbolic discounting in discrete time that one
has to adopt a three period time framework in order to be able to capture time
inconsistency. In the standard model, it is always assumed that the representative
agent lives forever. This is justiﬁed by the following reasons. Technically, under
an inﬁnite horizon, one does not face the problem of being forced to specify what
happens after the end of the time horizon is reached. Moreover, one does not have
to be concerned with the time horizon as an additional exogenous variable, i.e.
specifying the concrete length of the time period under consideration. Theoreti-
cally, one avoids running into the aggregation problem. As Blanchard (1985) has
argued, if the agent lives only ﬁnitely, one cannot take him as a metaphor rep-
resenting the entire diﬀerences between agents in the economy, but has to use an
overlapping-generation-model instead. If individuals do not live forever, they will
have diﬀerent ages and remaining lifetimes, and thus diﬀerent levels of wealth and
diﬀerent marginal propensities to consume, a fact that makes the use of the rep-
resentative agent a very critical assumption.18 Foregoing the diﬀerences between
heterogeneous agents, I will adopt a ﬁnite time horizon for deriving the consump-
tion decisions. In a standard discrete time model, it would be suﬃcient to use a two
period framework. However, in order to be able to model hyperbolic discounting,
it is necessary to adopt a three period framework, since only this makes it possible
to get time inconsistency. Adopting hyperbolic discounting also leads to another
dimension of the time horizon. Since the occurring time inconsistency is usually
modeled as an intrapersonal game between the agent’s diﬀerent current and future
selves, one has to use game theory to solve the optimizing decision. Under a ﬁnite
horizon, it is principally possible to solve the game by backward induction, i.e. one
gets a unique solution. By contrast, under an inﬁnite horizon, multiple equilibrium
paths are possible.19
3.3 The Role of Capital Accumulation
Introducing capital accumulation into the analysis does not only have eﬀects on
ﬁrms’ price setting but also on the role of consumption smoothing. This has gained
17See for this example Thaler (1981).
18By contrast, assuming an inﬁnite horizon is not a necessary condition for the existence of the
Ricardian equivalence concerning the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, since this can also be derived under
the assumption of a bequest motive of the ﬁnitely living agent.
19See Harris and Laibson (2001a) and Harris and Laibson (2001b). The authors claim that their
results hold under an inﬁnite horizon as well.
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new prominence due to the introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers into the stan-
dard model and is also relevant for the model with hyperbolic discounting. The
argument behind this goes as follows.
In neoclassical consumption theory, consumers smooth their consumption with
regard to the expected growth of future income. However, this future income is
considered to be non-risky, i.e., the risk of getting unemployed in the future and
thus experiencing an income of zero is either not modeled at all or assumed to be
idiosyncratic and thus diversiﬁable.20 If labor income is not treated as diversiﬁable
anymore and thus becomes an aggregate risk, this makes consumption smoothing
less obvious. If a higher expected income growth comes along with a higher variance
of future income, this leads to precautionary saving, i.e., the consumer tries to insure
himself against this additional risk by consuming less today. This then works as a
self-imposed credit restriction: the consumer is not borrowing against his expected
future income due to its riskiness.21
In the New Keynesian approach, this topic has been dealt with in two ways. In
the models by Woodford22, perfect ﬁnancial markets have been assumed, implying
that labor income risk is diversiﬁable. In models where this assumption has not been
made explicit, a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation around the Euler equation has been
taken in order to derive the New Keynesian IS-curve.23 By contrast, introducing
rule-of-thumb consumers, Gal´ ı et al. (2004) claim that this makes it necessary to
introduce capital accumulation in order to have an explicit distinction between a
rational, optimizing and consumption smoothing agent when facing risk, and a non-
optimizing, non-consumption smoothing rule-of-thumb consumer, who consumes his
current income in every period.24 To sum up, in order to get an important role
for consumption smoothing, either one has to assume perfect ﬁnancial markets,
i.e. to assume that future labor income is diversiﬁable, or one has to introduce
capital accumulation in order to have a means of consumption smoothing. In this
derivation, I will adopt imperfect ﬁnancial markets, leaving a thorough treatment
of capital accumulation for further research.
20In the seminal paper by Hall (1978), this assumption is made explicit by using a quadratic
utility function which makes the variance of future income drop out during the optimization pro-
cess. The assumption of a quadratic utility function has been highly criticized by later authors
(Blanchard and Mankiw (1988)) and has been replaced by CARA or CRRA utility functions with
more adequate properties.
21See for an exposition of precautionary saving, or buﬀer stock models, Carroll and Kimball
(2006).
22E.g. Woodford (1996) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
23However, Kimball (1990) has shown that one needs a second-order approximation in order to
model non-diversiﬁable risk.
24”Notice that in the absence of capital accumulation, the only diﬀerence in behavior across
household types would be a consequence of the fact that Ricardian households obtain some dividend
income from the ownership of ﬁrms. Yet, the existence of a market for ﬁrms’ stocks would not
provide a means to smooth consumption, since, in equilibrium, all shares would have to be held
by Ricardian consumers in equal proportions.” (Gal´ ı et al., 2004)
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3.4 Consumers and Present Bias
I will introduce hyperbolic discounting in the consumption decisions of households
trying to show the implications for the derivation of the IS curve. Introducing mi-
croeconomic insights from Behavioral Economics into general equilibrium macroeco-
nomic models has been rare. Exceptions are Barro (1999) who is focusing on the im-
plications of hyperbolic discounting in the Ramsey growth model, Graham and Snower
(2008) who model the long-run Phillips Curve under hyperbolic discounting and less
directly De Grauwe (2008), who deals with a diﬀerent way of expectations forma-
tion. However, apart from Graham and Snower (2008) who locate the main analysis
on the labor market, a thorough treatment of the New Keynesian model with hy-
perbolic discounting has not yet been done.
For deriving the IS-curve under hyperbolic discounting, I will make use of the
results of Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) and especially Harris and Laibson (2001a),
who have derived a Generalized Euler Equation under hyperbolic discounting. It
is important to note that they start from a precautionary saving model as pro-
posed by Carroll and Kimball (2006), i.e., labor income is non-diversiﬁable and
thus households are liquidity constrained. Hyperbolic discounting makes individuals
very impatient; they always prefer current consumption over future consumption.
Adding liquidity constraints then prevents these impatient consumers from borrow-
ing against all their future income, leading to a strong comovement between current
consumption and current income which has often been found in the data.25
I do not include a labor market and I also do not put money in the utility
function. The neglect of the ﬁrst is due to the fact that the labor market only plays
a role in deriving unemployment, which is not the aim of this paper.26 Moreover, to
simplify the analysis, I will use log-utility, thus neglecting precautionary saving.











for t = t,t + 1,t + 2, and with the hyperbolic discount factor δ ≥ 0 and the
exponential discount factor β ≥ 0. This contains the quasi-hyperbolic case, if both
δ,β < 1.
25The literature distinguishes between sophisticated agents, who anticipate that later selves will
have diﬀerent preferences and try to adopt strategies to prevent a change in behavior, whereas
the naive agent does not take this into account. Commitment as one strategy of early selves
leads to the fact that hyperbolic consumers hold a higher level of illiquid assets than exponential
ones in order to prevent future selves to change their actions. Under full commitment, both
exponential and hyperbolic consumer types behave fairly similar, even if in some cases there can
be remarkable diﬀerences (Angeletos et al., 2001). For the purpose of this paper, these diﬀerences
are not important.
26The New Keynesian model fails to explain involuntary unemployment without modeling some
sort of real rigidities on the labor market.
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where Xt/Pt ≥ 0 is ”cash-on-hand”, i.e. the agent’s original endowments, liquid
wealth, or initial real money balances.
In the subsequent periods t + 1 and t + 2, the agent receives labor income e Yt,
which is supposed to be stochastic i.i.d., symbolized by the tilde. Including savings
given the nominal interest rate Rt from the ﬁrst period, the subsequent budget











This problem can then be solved by using dynamic programming. This method,
ﬁrst introduced by Bellman, deals with solutions for discrete time optimization prob-
lems. Variables are split into state and control variables. The ﬁrst one characterizes
the state of a system, whereas its initial state Xt is historically given (= endowments
or ”cash-on-hand”). Since labor income is random, the only state variable of the
system is liquid wealth Xt. The control variables are the choices of the decision
maker (here: consumption). Assuming a value for Xt, the whole time path can
be computed. The value function describes the time path which maximizes utility
summed over the whole time period. Since one has to solve a game under time
inconsistency, one has to slightly adjust the method. Considering a ﬁnite time hori-
zon, one can solve the game by backward induction. Adopting the perspective of
self t, two diﬀerent value functions have to be speciﬁed, thus splitting the problem
into two parts. This can be seen by spelling out the utility function (1) from the
perspective of self t:






Hence, self t faces two choices: He has to choose between today’s consumption
and the entire future consumption being additionally discounted by δ, and he has
to choose between the diﬀerent future periods. The ﬁrst choice is the hyperbolic
decision, the second choice is the standard exponential decision. Note that for the
latter, self t uses the same exponential discount factor β for the subsequent periods
t + 1 and t + 2. Thus, one can set up a continuation-value function V (Xt+1/Pt+1),
i.e. the expected present discounted value of the utility stream beginning in t + 1,

















27Woodford (1996), assuming perfect ﬁnancial markets, shows that the ﬂow budget constraint
adopted here can be equally expressed as a set of intertemporal budget constraints, if a Non-Ponzi
condition on borrowing is satisﬁed.
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Note, that in an inﬁnite time horizon model, this continuation-value function
would be the same for all the periods following t + 1, seen from the perspective of
self t. In my three-period framework, however, the continuation-value function in












In a second step, at time t, self t uses the discount factor βδ, thus his current






















Since consumption is chosen by self t in the current period t, he maximizes utility



























Next, one can show a direct link between the continuation-value function V and
the current-value function W. To do so, ﬁrst forward the expression for the current-


























Then, this expression can be plugged into the continuation-value function V in
(6):
28In what follows, I will assume that this expression holds with equality, which is the case if
C(Xt) < Xt, since then the term in the bracket becomes positive.









































Finally, this expression linking the current- and the continuation-value function
can be combined with the FOC in (10) to give the Hyperbolic Euler Equation:29












































In order to replace W ′(Xt+1/Pt+1), one can use the Envelope theorem: stating
that any derivative of the current-value function W with respect to the choice vari-
able Ct must be equal to zero, one gets the result that the derivative of W with



















Substituting and rearranging yields the Hyperbolic Euler Equation. If δ = 1,


























































Harris and Laibson (2001a) call the term in brackets the ”eﬀective discount fac-
tor”, which is a weighted average of the short-run discount factor βδ and the long-run
29Harris and Laibson (2001a) call this the Strong Hyperbolic Euler Equation derived under the
assumption of a continuous consumption function. They show that a more general expression also
holds if this is not the case.
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(exponential) discount factor β. The weights are the marginal propensity to con-
sume (MPC) out of liquid wealth, and 1 − MPC. Remember that the consumer is
assumed to be liquidity constrained. This leads to the fact that a negative income
shock reduces cash-on-hand, since the consumer cannot insure himself against this
shock. And if he does so by keeping a buﬀer stock of precautionary savings, this
works as a self-imposed liquidity constraint. In case of liquidity constraints, con-
sumers will have a high MPC, since every increase in income acts as a relaxation of
the (self-imposed) constraint and is thus nearly totally consumed. Hence, consumers
with low level of cash-on-hand will have a high MPC. Changes in the future MPC
aﬀect the consumer as follows. Note that the eﬀective discount factor is the higher
the lower the future marginal propensity to consume. A rise in the future marginal
propensity to consume signals to self t that the future self t+1 will consume more,
thus reducing the planned saving of self t. However, self t values marginal saving
in period t + 1 more than marginal consumption, thus a rise in the expected MPC
makes self t value the future less than the present.30 And, given that low levels of
cash-on-hand imply a high MPC, this leads to a stronger comovement of current
consumption and income. This is exactly the behavior which has been assumed by
Gal´ ı et al. (2007), though, by using hyperbolic discounting and liquidity constraints,
it could have been derived from microeconomic optimization.
To derive an IS-curve from this Hyperbolic Euler Equation, the standard proce-
dure of log-linearization can be applied. Under CRRA-utility (U = C1−η/(1−η)), in-
cluding prices, and deﬁning MPCt+1 ≡ C′(Xt+1), φ ≡ 1−δ, and πt+1 ≡ lnPt+1−lnPt,











− ηlnCt − lnPt = lnRβ + lnEt [(δ − 1)MPCt+1 + 1] − Et[lnPt+1] − ηEt[lnCt+1]
− ηlnCt = lnRβ + lnEt [1 − (1 − δ)MPCt+1] − Et[lnPt+1] + lnPt − ηEt[lnCt+1]










lnCt = Et[lnCt+1] −
1
η
(lnRβ − Et[πt+1] + lnEt [1 − φMPCt+1])
Remember that I treat a closed economy without state and capital accumulation.
In this case one can simply replace Ct by Yt in the equation above in order to get the
IS-curve. However, one can also model the other components of the goods market
equilibrium as demand shocks. Let X = I + G + EX − IM, one can write for the
goods market:
30Under commitment, this makes the self in t keep less liquid cash-on-hand, in order to prevent
self t + 1 from overconsuming.
31Note that I have not derived the role for prices explicitly. However, this can be done easily by
allowing for bonds in the budget constraint (Luttmer and Mariotti, 2003).
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Ct = Yt − Xt = (1 − Xt/Yt)Yt (18)
Then, taking logarithms, deﬁning −ln(1 − Xt/Yt) ≡ Dt, one gets lnCt = lnYt −
lnDt which can be substituted into the Euler equation to yield the IS-curve:
lnYt − lnDt = Et[lnYt+1 − lnDt+1] −
1
η
(lnRβ − Et[πt+1] + lnEt [1 − φMPCt+1])
lnYt = Et[lnYt+1] −
1
η
(lnRβ − Et[πt+1] + lnEt [1 − φMPCt+1]) + ǫd,t, (19)
where ǫd,t ≡ lnDt − Et[lnDt+1] is deﬁned as demand shock. The diﬀerence to the
standard New Keynesian IS-curve is the last term, i.e. the appearance of the ex-
pected future marginal propensity to consume MPCt+1. A rise in the expected
MPC increases output today, since it reduces the role for intertemporal substitution
of consumption. In case of higher real interest rates, the representative consumer
would wish to postpone consumption to later periods. However, in case of hyper-
bolic discounting, he knows that his self in the next period will not stick to this
plan, thus his current saving is reduced. One would thus expect a reduced eﬀect of
higher real interest rates on current output.
4 Conclusion and Outlook
To sum up, note that the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it summa-
rized the state of the art of the ongoing research in the standard New Keynesian
Macroeconomic Model. It has been shown that a range of questions remains unan-
swered, concerning especially the explanation of serial correlation and the (long run)
eﬀects of macroeconomic policy. Second, hyperbolic discounting has been used for
the derivation of the New Keynesian IS curve. It has been argued that for analytical
simplicity, both a ﬁnite and an inﬁnite time horizon can be useful. Indeed, apart
from being able to forgo the distinctions between economic agents and the problem
of multiple equilibria in the intrapersonal game, adopting an inﬁnite horizon does
not make a huge diﬀerence. Concerning the results, it has been shown that using
hyperbolic discounting in a New Keynesian Macroeconomic Model can be promis-
ing and deserves further research. In contrast to rule-of-thumbs, which are usually
assumed ad hoc, this ﬁrst model builds on microeconomic evidence and is also able
to give similar results, for example with respect to the comovement of income and
consumption.
Several open questions remain for further research. First, note that I have not
dealt with ﬁrm behavior and the question of general equilibrium. It would certainly
be worth preceding this analysis and running simulations to examine whether the
hyperbolic New Keynesian model can lead to greater persistency in the data than
in the standard formulation. Second, with regard to consumption, it would be in-
teresting to extend the model further by allowing for mental accounting. This has
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shown to be one way to deal with the commitment problem of agents and results
in diﬀerent marginal propensities to consume depending on the source of income.
Third, I think it could be promising to analyze the eﬀects of hyperbolic discounting
in state-dependent models. In these models, the mark-up ﬁrms are able to change
can be dependent on ﬁrms’ price setting, which confronts ﬁrms with a double choice
and thus possibly with a time inconsistency problem. In a broader context, one could
link the topic of time discounting to institutional policy questions. Households can
avoid the time inconsistency problem by committing themselves to savings schemes
that can only be dissolved under high ﬁnancial costs. However, in the course of the
ongoing ﬁnancial liberalization and ﬂexibilization, one could imagine that it becomes
much harder for households to gain access to self-committing ﬁnancial products. In
a similar vein, with respect to ﬁrms, one can imagine institutional arrangements, as
ﬁnancing investment by banks instead of ﬁnancial markets for example, that over-
come the present bias in management behavior. This would extend the ”Varieties of
Capitalism” research program32 analyzing diﬀerent institutional settings that have
been developed in order to overcome coordination and principal agent problems.
Finally, it is worth noting that there are some authors who argue that adopting
hyperbolic discounting in the way it has been done in this model is not enough.
Rubinstein (2003) has claimed that the empirical and experimental evidence point-
ing against the standard exponential discounting can also be interpreted against its
now widely used alternative. He suggests that the evidence cannot only be explained
by changing the utility function slightly by adding a second discount factor, but can
also be interpreted by a procedural approach, for which he provides further sup-
port by experiments. However, Rubinstein does not argue for a return to standard
exponential discounting, but asks for a much more radical approach to deal with
decision making: rather than ”marginally modifying our models, we need to open
the black box of decision making, and come up with some completely new and fresh
modeling devices.”33 So far, however, applying hyperbolic discounting to macroeco-
nomic models seems to do a rather good job as a ﬁrst step to build a ”Behavioral
Macroeconomics”.
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